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ABSTRACT
In the early 1990s, after decades of high inflation and financial repression, Argentina
embarked on a course of macroeconomic and bank regulatory reform.  Bank regulatory policy
promoted privatization, financial liberalization, and free entry, limited safety net support, and
established a novel mix of regulatory and market discipline to ensure stable growth of the banking
system during the liberalization process.  Argentina suffered some fallout from the Mexican
tequila crisis of 1995, but its response to that crisis (allowing weak banks to close) and the
redoubling of regulatory efforts to promote market discipline after the crisis made Argentina’s
banking system quite resilient during the Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises.  Argentina’s bank
regulatory system now is widely regarded as one of the two or three most successful among
emerging market economies.  This paper traces the evolution of the regulatory policy changes of
the 1990s and shows that the reliance on market discipline has played an important role in
prudential regulation by encouraging proper risk management by banks.  There is substantial
heterogeneity among banks in the interest rates they pay for debt and the rate of growth of their
deposits, and that heterogeneity is traceable to fundamental attributes of banks that affect the
riskiness of deposits (i.e. asset risk and leverage).  Moreover, market perceptions of default risk
are mean-reverting, indicating that market discipline encourages banks to respond to increases in
default risk by limiting asset risk or lowering leverage.
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  In common with many other emerging market countries, Argentina’s banking sector was 
liberalized in the 1990s.  That liberalization followed decades of severe “financial repression.”  
The return to deposits placed in banks previously was substantially negative; if $100 worth of 
deposits had been placed in an Argentine bank in 1944, it would today be worth roughly 3 cents 
in real terms today (and 1 cent in 1990).
1  As recently as 1990, bank deposits were frozen as part 
of an emergency fiscal adjustment.  As elsewhere, liberalization involved lifting controls on 
interest rates, deregulation of the banking sector, allowing the entry of foreign capital, 
privatization and adopting international regulatory standards.  
Nevertheless, the experience of the Argentine banking sector over the past decade has 
been unique in several respects.  Many observers view Argentina’s reforms as among the most 
radical attempts to overhaul a banking system.  Traditionally in Argentina, credit was allocated 
either to the public sector or through public intervention to specific sectors or projects in the 
private sector.  Moreover, the banking sector suffered from ineffective regulation and 
supervision and  repeated, forced government rescues contributed significantly  to Argentina’s 
past fiscal and inflationary problems.  In contrast, many have argued that today there is a 
credible, restrictive safety net and high regulatory and supervisory standards.  For example, as 
shown in Table 1, one World Bank study rated Argentina’s regulatory regime on par with Hong 
Kong, second only to Singapore, and higher than the longer-lived and much-admired regime in 
Chile
2. In particular, the Argentine system is praised for its attempt to introduce elements of 
private market discipline as a central component of its regulatory regime. 
Table 1.  World Bank Comparison of Bank Regulatory Quality in  
Developing Economies 
  Total   Capital   Loan   Foreign  Liquidity  Operating  Transparency 
Country Score  Position  Classification  Ownership   Environment 
      (management)     
             
 Singapore  16 1  6  2  5  1  1 
 Argentina  21 1  4  3  4  7  2 
 Hong Kong  21 3  9  1  2  2  4 
 Chile  25 5  1  4  8  5  2 
 Brazil  30 7  3  4  3  8  5 
 Peru  35 5  2  6  1  11  10 
 Malaysia  41 5  9  8  8  3  8 
 Colombia  44 3  4  11  6  10  10 
 Korea  45 7  9  10 11  3  5 
 Philippines  47 4  6  7  7  11  12 
 Thailand  52 7  12  12  8  6  7 
 Indonesia  52 7  8  9  12  8  8 
              
Source: World Bank (1998), p. 54.  Numbers indicate rankings, where low numbers mean high ranking.   
The total score is a simple average of the six categories.       
                                                            
1 Central Bank estimates. 
2 We note, however, that Chile has since revised and strengthened its capital requirements on banks.  2 
Private market discipline is enhanced by the following policies: (a) A strictly limited 
safety net (comprised of a privately funded, limited deposit insurance scheme and restrictions on 
the Central Bank's potential lender of last resort powers) exposes bank depositors to the 
possibility of loss. (b) High and credible minimum risk-based capital requirements further ensure 
that stockholders (rather than taxpayers) bear the risk of bank default. (c) National government 
programs encourage the privatization of provincial government-owned banks. (d) A credit rating 
scheme has been introduced whereby each bank must solicit a credit rating from an 
internationally active rating agency. (e) A subordinated debt requirement mandates that banks 
must issue a subordinated liability for some 2% of deposits each year. (f) Banks must satisfy a 
“liquidity requirement” in addition to the capital requirement. This not only reduces portfolio 
risk, ensures systemic liquidity, and further reduces the potential for taxpayer loss from failed 
banks, but (because of the structure of the requirement) rewards banks with lower regulatory cost 
when the market perceives that their risk of failure is low. (g) The Central Bank publishes  basic 
information about bank loans to individuals and firms that borrow from banks (which enhances 
transparency of credit risk).  (h) The quality of accounting data is enhanced by mandatory private 
audits conducted according to Central Bank guidelines, and auditors must post a forfeitable 
bond.  (i) Argentina permits free entry and competition among foreign and domestic banks, 
which not only encourages the efficient management of banks, but also enhances the ability of 
bank depositors to punish weak banks by moving their funds to stronger institutions. 
The Argentine system’s high marks from the World Bank also reflect the fact that the 
regulatory reforms put in place in the early and mid-1990s have been tested by external 
shocks.The reactions of the banking authorities to those shocks have been encouraging to 
advocates of market discipline. Rather than retreating from the reform process in the face of the 
“tequila” crisis of 1994-1995, the Argentine authorities redoubled their efforts to ensure that 
market discipline prevailed in the banking system.  Indeed, many of the features of the current 
regulatory system listed above were enacted or strengthened after the tequila crisis, as part of a 
new plan for bank oversight developed at the central bank, which is known as the B.A.S.I.C. 
system of bank regulation.   
We define the key elements of that system, and explain its evolution, in Section II below. 
These included the new liquidity requirement system (replacing a more traditional reserve 
requirement approach), capital requirements that reflect banks' trading risks and banking book 
interest rate risks, an expansion of the publicly available database on the condition of bank 
borrowers, as well as the minimum mandatory subordinated debt and credit rating requirement.  
The authorities have also negotiated a contingent liquidity facility with international banks in 
order to be able to inject emergency liquidity on the basis of Argentine collateral in the case of a 
sharp, systemic, liquidity shock (this facility currently stands at some $6.45bn excluding a $1bn 
World Bank/IDB enhancement).  Also over this period there was significant entry of foreign 
capital to the banking system such that, at the time of this writing, some 60% of private sector 
deposits are now in banks under foreign control, accounting for some 40% of the whole system. 
There remains only one large (top 8) private retail bank that does not have a foreign controlling 
interest. 
The only policy reaction to the 1995 crisis that could be construed as a weakening of the 
commitment to market discipline was the reestablishment of deposit insurance. But the 
significance of this change for market discipline should not be exaggerated. In November 1992, 4 
significantly in 1992, and the rest of the economy received large injections of foreign capital 
between 1992 and 1996, it was only in the years 1997 and 1998 that the banking system saw a 
very significant increase in foreign capital.  One hypothesis is that these international banks 
waited until the system was tested by its first major external shock before making such 
significant investment decisions. 
Despite this record of apparent success, the reforms and transformation of the banking 
system have not gone without criticism.  Some have suggested that the enactment of limited 
deposit insurance was unnecessary and counterproductive, that more institutions should have 
been allowed to fail, and that some assisted mergers, particularly during the tequila period, 
simply delayed a problem rather than solving it (see World Bank (1998)).  Other critics have 
suggested that Argentina's banking regulations are too tight (in particular capital, liquidity and 
provisioning) and have diminished banking sector returns and placed the sector at a disadvantage 
with respect to foreign banks. Other criticisms refer to particular regulations.  Some suggest, for 
example, that a regulatory authority should not establish requirements for the private rating of 
banks. Others suggest that the effectiveness of the obligation to issue subordinated debt, and 
therefore, market discipline, has been reduced because the penalties for non-compliance have 
been lowered –  a consequence of the perceived difficulties of issuing debt in the wake of the 
international financial crises of 1997 and 1998.  Finally, it has been suggested that the entry by 
foreign banks may have a drawback; some perceive foreign banks as having  more restricted 
lending practices than national banks, and blame those lending policies for exacerbating the 
current recession. 
In this paper we review the record of bank regulation and evaluate that record from the 
perspective of evidence on the existence of market discipline.  We consider  evidence on the 
question of whether and to what extent banks have been disciplined by the market. Section II 
provides an overview of the evolution of the regulatory environment from 1992 to the present, 
and an evaluation of its consequences for the structure and performance of banks and their 
exposure to market discipline. Section III brings econometric evidence to bear on the question of 
the extent to which market discipline penalizes risk and constrains bank behavior.  Thus, in 
addition to evaluating the record of regulatory enforcement in the narrow legal sense, we also 
examine the economic evidence that market discipline exists, and that it has in fact achieved its 
desired goal of limiting bank risk taking.  
Specifically, Section II summarizes the experience with privatization, foreign entry, 
consolidation, bank failure and depositor loss experience.  Section III focuses on differences in 
bank deposit interest rate risk premia, and differences in deposit growth, with an emphasis on the 
degree of diversity within the system with respect to these measures of market discipline.  It then 
develops a  framework for identifying links between fundamentals that affect bank default risk 
and market reactions to that risk (as seen through higher interest rates on deposits and lower 
deposit growth).  Finally, we consider evidence on the effectiveness of market discipline in 
constraining bank risk taking.  Section IV concludes. 5 
II. The Development of the Regulatory Framework, 1992-1999 
The origins of banking reform 
The economic turbulence of the late 1980s and the hyperinflations of 1989 and 1990 
virtually destroyed the Argentine financial system.  M3/GDP, which had stood at almost 50% in 
the 1940s, declined over the following decades and then fell very sharply, reaching a mere 5% as 
of 1990.  The fiscal reforms of 1989 and 1990 sowed the seeds of the end of inflationary 
financing in Argentina.  However, as part of those reforms, the 1989 Bonex plan (which included  
replacing bank deposits with Bonex bonds trading at deep discounts) had a significant adverse 
impact on the financial system. A path to reform based on the seizure of private property housed 
in the banking system does not encourage rapid faith in the safety of bank deposits.   
Nevertheless, since 1990 confidence gradually has returned and deposits have grown 
strongly.  M3 has risen and is now some 30% of GDP.  Although this is still a low level for a 
country of Argentina's GDP per capita and level of development, this financial system growth 
has been rapid and reflects the transformation of a private banking system, which has resumed its 
role of allocating credit to the private sector. 
Macroeconomic stability returned with the imposition of the April 1991 currency board 
(enshrined in the Convertibility Law), and a very significant opening and further liberalization of 
the economy, including the banking system. The legal and regulatory environment in the 
financial system was further defined with a new (September 1992) Central Bank charter.  This 
established Central Bank independence (as in its 1936 creation), and recreated the banking 
Superintendency as a semi-autonomous unit within the Central Bank.  The Central Bank has 10 
full-time directors proposed by the executive and approved by the Senate) including the 
President, Vice-President,  Superintendent and Vice-Superintendent of banking supervision.  The 
Central Bank was given a significant degree of autonomy with respect to banking regulation and 
supervision (e.g. capital and other requirements can be changed by a simple decision of the 
Board) but its role in monetary policy and lender of last resort activities is severely restricted by 
the 1991 Convertibility Law and 1992 charter.. 
  Table 2 lists the main regulatory changes over the period 1992-1999. The period 1992-
1994 was one of strong economic growth and fast development of the financial system, albeit 
from a very small base.  In this context the Central Bank worked to impose international capital, 
accounting and provisioning standards and to improve banking supervision.  The financial 
system had lost virtually all deposits and hence banks were very highly capitalized implying that 
high capital standards were not too difficult to impose at that time.  A minimum of 9.5% of 
assets at risk was the standard required as of the end of 1992, rising to 11.5% from January 1
st 
1995  (0.5% rises were effected each 6 months).  On top of these requirements, Argentina also 
introduced a capital requirement for credit risk, which uses the interest rate charged on each loan 
as a signal of credit risk, and requires that capital rise accordingly.  Actual minimum capital 
requirements by the end of 1994 were then some 14% of assets at risk – well-above minimum 
capital requirements set by the Basel standards, or those required in other developing economies. 
Provisioning requirements were tightened significantly at the end of 1994 and through 1995.   6 
Other improvements in banking supervision were underway well before the tequila crisis.  
In 1992, the Central Bank created a database of the main debtors of the financial system (for 
loans of more than $200,000).  Argentina also maintained a system of high reserve requirements 
which explicitly were viewed at the time as a liquidity tool (that is, both as a means of limiting 
asset risk, and as a way of protecting the banking system from the risk of depositor flight).   
These non-remunerated reserve requirements were also thought of as a tax on banks. The 
required reserve ratios were set at high levels on sight deposits and at low levels on time 
deposits.  That difference did not reflect underlying liquidity risk differences between time and 
demand deposits so much as the inelasticity of demand for sight deposits (i.e. the desire to avoid 
financial disintermediation in reaction to the taxation of banks).  As we discuss below, time 




Table 2.  Main Regulatory Advances in Argentina 1991-1999 
 
 
April 1991 Currency Board Adopted (backing of monetary base and ex rate 10,000:1, 
subsequently 1:1). 
 
September 1992 New Charter of the Central Bank. 
 
December 1992 Deposit Insurance Abolished. 
 
1992-1994 Basel Capital Requirements Adopted, Raised to 11.5% at December 1994. 
 
1994-1995 Provisioning Requirements Tightened. 
 
April 1995 Limited, Fully Funded, Deposit Insurance, $20,000 (subsequently $30,000). 
 
August 1995 Liquidity Requirement System (Rasied to 20% of Deposits through 1997). 
 
September 1996 Market Risk Capital Requirements. 
 
1997-1998 BASIC Introduced  (B for Bonds, C for Credit Rating etc). 
 
March 1999 Capital Requirements for Interest Rate Risk 
 
 
  The nineteen eighties had left Argentina with a very large number of small financial 
institutions, many of which disappeared in the 1990s.  In the pre-reform period, these institutions 
had become government financing vehicles rather than a proper means of channeling credit to 
the productive sectors of the economy.  With macroeconomic stability, low inflation and 
liberalization many such institutions – which lacked the skills to survive in the new environment 7 
– faced the daunting challenge of transforming themselves into bona fide competitive providers 
of credit.  Many survived into the 1990s as they  attempted to change their focus.  According to 
one view of that transition period, the strong economic growth and sharp rises in Argentine asset 
prices in the period 1992-1994 (at least until the change in direction of US interest rate policy in 
February 1994), coupled with high levels of bank capital, gave a breathing space to many 
institutions as they attempted to adapt to the new circumstances. An alternative interpretation of 
this period of economic boom is that it allowed many institutions to survive despite underlying 
weaknesses that only became apparent in subsequent periods of stress. 
  Table 3 gives statistics on the number and type of financial institutions in Argentina over 
the 1990's and the total size of the system.  Table 3 shows that there has been substantial 
restructuring in the Argentine financial system.  From 1980 to 1992 over 250 institutions closed.  
While 210 of these were non-bank financial institutions, 48 were banks.  Between 1992 and 1994 
there was actually relatively little restructuring activity and while a set of further non-banks 
closed their doors, new banks opened as the system re-orientated its focus.  Also in this period 
the privatization process commenced with 3 entities privatized.  There was then a second quite 
ferocious wave of restructuring activity through 1995 – the so-called tequila period – and to a 
lesser extent this process has continued through 1999.  From the end of 1994 to September 1999 
over 90  institutions closed, including 54 banks and 14 non-banks.  There were also a significant 
number of privatizations (18).  As these privatizations were banks transferred to the private 
sector, the number of total bank closures (including both private and public banks) was 72 
(54+18). 
Table 3.  Structure of the Financial System 
  1980  1992  1994  Sep-99 
       
Number of 
Institutions 
469   212   205   119  
       
     Private  179   131   135   81  
          
Wholesale 
n.a.  32   34   31  
          Retail  n.a.  99   101   50  
       
          Foreign 
owned 
27   31   31   48  
       
     Public  35   36   33   15  
       
     Non-bank  255   45   37   23  
Total Deposits 
(¹) 
55,020   26,002   42,278   74,693  
(¹) In millions of pesos of 1993.      8 
The “Tequila” Crisis 
  Despite the advances in regulation and supervision in 1992-1994, the events of late 1994 
(particularly after the December 20
th Mexican devaluation) and early 1995 exposed weaknesses 
in many institutions.  The tequila period was a very significant event for the financial system and 
as such it is worth explaining the main events and regulatory response in some detail.  After 
December 20
th, a dramatic fall in Argentine asset prices significantly affected the solvency ratios 
of several wholesale banks with relatively large government bond portfolios or other financial 
market exposures.  At the same time, because these institutions had only a small amount of sight 
deposits, they had little in the way of liquidity reserves at the central bank.  Several such 
institutions experienced a significant loss of deposits and hence a sharp liquidity crunch. 
Cooperative and some provincial banks also fared particularly badly reflecting their low-quality 
loan portfolios.  Nevertheless, while the financial system lost deposits in January and February, 
this period could not be described as a systemic panic; larger retail banks and large public banks 
gained deposits, and deposits denominated in dollars overall also rose (see BCRA 1995 and 
D'Amato, Grubisic and Powell 1997 for more details).  This phase of the shock was largely a 
flight to quality. 
  The Central Bank responded to these events in a number of ways. Within the Central 
Bank there was an interesting debate as to whether the problem being faced was a run on the 
currency, which might require a tightening of monetary conditions (i.e.  a raising of reserve 
requirements), or alternatively a liquidity problem, which would require the opposite policy.  In 
the wake of the monetary contraction and a deteriorating macroeconomic environment, it was 
soon realized that the greater  problem was a potential banking sector liquidity crisis, rather than 
a run on the peso. Hence reserve requirements were lowered.   
The distribution of liquidity within the system was as significant a problem as its 
aggregate amount. Large retail banks had large reserves in the Central Bank and gained deposits 
while wholesale banks had low reserves in the Central Bank and were losing deposits. A private 
liquidity sharing system was negotiated for the banking system.  However, the amount of 
liquidity actually circulated via that mechanism was very restricted. Thus the authorities also set 
up an obligatory system through an extra (2%) reserve requirement on certain banks, which was 
then distributed through the publicly owned Banco Nación.  Finally the Central Bank extended 
repos and rediscounts to other affected institutions according to the rules laid down in the Central 
Bank's 1992 charter. 
  The end of February 1995 was a critical moment.  The Central Bank was finding that the 
rules on how it could provide rediscounts were very restrictive (being limited to 30 days and to 
never exceed the regulatory capital of the borrowing bank) and on February 27
th Congress 
approved a set of changes.  These modifications included being able to extend rediscounts for 
longer periods and, under exceptional circumstances, for an amount exceeding the regulatory 
capital of the bank.  Some interpreted these changes as a weakening of Convertibility itself.   
By February Argentina's fiscal position had deteriorated markedly and there was no 
agreement yet in place with the IMF. Argentina had missed an IMF fiscal target at the end of 
1994 and the authorities had not agreed to a new program.  Finally, the May14th Presidential 
election was looming and it had been agreed that this election would be fought subject to new 9 
electoral rules (a ballotage system) which created new uncertainty.  Opinion polls at the time put 
Carlos Menem in the lead but without enough votes to win comfortably in the first round, 
prompting speculation of potential second-round coalitions.  The opposition parties at the time 
were not perceived as being strong supporters of the currency board system, nor the very deep 
liberalization measures that had been pursued. 
  In this uncertain economic and political climate rumors abounded.  These centered on the 
state of the banking system and individual banks and the state of the fiscal accounts.  A persistent 
rumor was that the Government was considering, as a way out of the crisis, “freezing” bank 
deposits as had been done in 1989.  The deposit runs that had affected mostly individual banks 
spread throughout the system and in the first two weeks of March virtually all banks lost 
deposits.  Indeed, in this two week period roughly half of the total $8bn that left the system, fled 
the country.   
This more systemic run was halted in the middle of March with the signing of a new 
agreement with the IMF and an international support package with money from the IMF, the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.  A private bond was also launched 
(known as the Patriotic Bond with internal and external tranches – an early explicit example of 
“bailing in”).  Part of these funds financed two fiduciary funds for the banking system; one to 
assist provinces in the privatization of provincial banks and one to assist in the restructuring of 
the private banking system.  Deposits fell slightly from the day after this agreement was signed 
until May 14
th (the Presidential election date).  On Carlos Menem's victory in that election, and 
with much uncertainty thus resolved, deposits started to grow again, and the financial system 
recovered very quickly. 
  Despite the fact that the systemic run of March 1995 affected all the banks, depositors 
fled some banks more than others.  Schumacher (1997), Dabos and Sosa (1999), and Anastasi, 
Burdiso, Grubisic, and Lencioni (1998)  all conclude that banks that failed or were forced to 
merge over this period were much weaker institutions.  Each of these papers adopts a logit/probit 
methodology to explain bank “failures” as a function of banks’ ex ante observable 
characteristics.  Although each study is slightly different in the samples of banks used and the 
precise specification of the model, the main results are consistent across all the studies.  Each 
study reports that in over 90% of the cases the model correctly predicts failure or survival. Thus, 
although both Type 1 and Type 2 errors are found, they are very small in number. 
Anastasi et al. (1998) provides more extensive analysis of market discipline of banks 
using a larger sample of banks, a longer time series and a more complete set of models than the 
other papers.  In that paper  logit estimates are presented and as well as results for a survival 
analysis, where the predicted variable is the number of months a bank is expected to survive 
(after December 1994).  This is estimated using data as of the end of 1994 and predictions are 
updated on a quarterly basis.  A rather small subset of bank fundamentals are found to be 
significant explanatory variables, and these variables correctly predict over 90% of banks' 
survival experience even when the set of predictors is constrained to the predicting variables as 10 
of December 1994.  Little is added to predictive power when explanatory variables are updated 
quarterly
3.   
D'Amato, Grubisic and Powell (1997) develop a slightly different approach.  Here the 
authors examine whether the amount of deposits lost during the crisis, on a bank by bank basis, 
could be explained by bank fundamentals, macroeconomic factors or “contagion”.  Contagion is 
defined here as serially correlated losses across banks that could not be explained either by 
macroeconomic influences or by changes in individual bank characteristics. This interpretation 
of significant panel time effects (indicating significant residual correlation) as potential 
“contagion” may overstate true contagion, since it could also be accounted for by time-varying 
coefficients or omitted variables. Nevertheless, what is striking in this study is that even this 
potentially overstated measure of contagion was not the most important influence on deposit 
loss. When explicit “contagion” terms were added (e.g.  the loss of deposits of other banks in the 
previous time period) it was found that additional time effects in the panel analysis became 
insignificant, indicating the importance of serial correlation of risk for the banking sector as a 
whole. However,  fundamental macroeconomic factors remained significant in generating 
aggregate risk, and the majority of the explained variation in deposits was accounted for by bank 
fundamentals, indicating the importance of bank soundness in depositors' decisions. 
  Table 4 summarizes the effect of the tequila period on the financial system.  It should be 
noted that between December and May, the system lost $8bn or 18% of deposits and the Central 
Bank lost some $5bn or 30% of international reserves.  Over this single year some 51 institutions 
were closed (12 liquidated and 39 merged) and 2 institutions were suspended and subsequently 
merged in 1996.  The total deposits in liquidated institutions in 1995 amounted to $958m and of 
this depositors received roughly 50% of their investments, losing an estimated $477m.  In 
addition other creditors (mainly bond holders), lost an estimated $249m.  This is a record of 
market discipline (i.e. actual depositor loss) that few countries have matched in recent decades.  
(Interestingly, Estonia in the early 1990s – a country also constrained by its commitment to a 
currency board – is the other example of significant depositor loss of which we are aware.) 
                                                            
3 As a caveat it is worth noting that if this model is re-estimated over different sample periods, although similar 
prediction success can be obtained, other bank fundamentals are preferred.  This indicates some potential instability 
in model specification or an alternative explanation might be a very flat likelihood function with respect to the 
different model specifications.  The Superintendency is now employing the results of this analysis in its off-site 
work. 11 
 
Table 4.  The "Tequila" Crisis 
Number of institutions (Dec 94)  205 
   
Institutions liquidated  12 
Number of mergers  39 
New institutions  4 
   
Number of institutions (Dec 95)  158 
   
Institutions suspended and then 
merged 
2 
   
   
Total deposits in liquidated 
institutions (¹) 
958 
Estimated total loss of deposits 
(¹) 
477 
Estimated total loss of other 
liabilities (¹) 
249 
   
(¹) In millions of pesos.   
 
Challenges and Reforms after the Tequila Crisis 
  Argentina had abolished deposit insurance in the early 1990s, and managed to weather 
the tequila storm without it.  Nevertheless, there was a perception among some that the complete 
absence of deposit insurance was too extreme and that its absence may have contributed to the 
flight from the banking system. A limited deposit insurance scheme was introduced in May 1995 
covering deposits of up to $20,000 and funded though premia on banks calculated using a risk-
based pricing formula.  This insurance scheme was implemented through a government-
sponsored enterprise – SEDESA  S.A. – which is  separate from the Central Bank.  The scheme 
has since been extended to cover deposits up to $30,000.   
Originally, SEDESA was originally seen as a body that would simply pay out to 
depositors in the case of a bank liquidation.  However, over time SEDESA's role and powers 
have been extended. SEDESA is now formally charged with a minimum cost resolution 
objective.  Additionally, the charter of the Central Bank has been altered to allow the Central 
Bank to separate the assets and liabilities of a failing bank.  In effect this allows the Central Bank 
to create a “good” bank that can then be sold and a “residual bank” that can be wound-up, thus 
avoiding the liquidation of the whole bank.  The residual bank rests in a type of “trust” backed 
by bonds.  Consistent with the minimum cost resolution guidelines, SEDESA's funds, and also 12 
funds of the Central Bank, have been used to finance this process through purchases of the bonds 
issued by the residual bank trust. 
  To some observers this process has appeared to be an efficient way of dealing with 
problem institutions involving very little public money; to others, it has reduced market 
discipline and potentially placed the Central Bank at risk of losing some of its investment, which 
seems to be at odds with the intent of the Convertibility Law (see, for example, World Bank 
1998).  That criticism reflects the view that some mergers are unsustainable combinations of 
weak institutions. The World Bank (1998) recommended requiring that acquiring banks have A 
or better credit ratings, in light of that risk. In the event, however, little adverse consequences 
have resulted from Central Bank involvement because merged banks have tended to improve 
over time. For example, banks rated BB have shown a greater probability of being upgraded 
rather than downgraded. That positive tendency is also reflected in the transition probability 
matrix of CAMEL ratings (see BCRA 1999).  It is also worth noting that – despite the possible 
advantages from following the World Bank’s recommendation to require a minimum quality 
standard for acquirers – the Central Bank currently lacks the legal tools to implement such a 
policy without leaving itself open to legal dispute. 
  Immediately after the tequila shock, beginning in August  1995, there was a very 
significant reform of the reserve requirement system.  During the crisis it was found that sight 
deposits were more stable than time deposits and that banks with more time deposits had lost a 
greater fraction of their deposits and (because of the relatively low reserve requirement on time 
deposits) had less liquidity available to them in the Central Bank.  It was decided to replace 
reserve requirements with a "liquidity requirement" acknowledging explicitly that these reserves 
were intended for “systemic liquidity protection”.  These new liquidity requirements were 
specified on virtually all liabilities (reserve requirements had been placed only on deposits) at 
rates which declined depending on the residual maturity of each liability and were required 
irrespective of the type of liability (sight deposit, time deposit, bond, etc).  Finally the liquidity 
requirements introduced were remunerated at rates approximately equal to short-term dollar 
interest rates, thus alleviating a substantial tax that had been placed on the financial system. 
  In recent years, the liquidity requirement has been further amended to permit the holding 
of balances in qualifying foreign banks to count toward as much as 80% of the requirement, and 
to permit the use of standbys from foreign banks as a substitute for deposits held abroad.  These 
rules reflect the intent of the liquidity requirement – a means to insulate the banking system 
against the flight of deposits – and the recognition that for that purpose hard currency balances 
held abroad may be as good or better than deposits held at the Central Bank.  Furthermore, the 
flexibility afforded by the use of standbys provides a market reward to low-risk banks, since 
those banks are able to obtain standbys at low cost from foreign banks. 
  Another lesson from the tequila crisis had been the importance of market risk as 
wholesale banks had maintained little regulatory capital against relatively large government bond 
positions.  In 1996, Argentina became one of the first countries to implement an adapted version 
of the Basel market risk capital requirement Amendment to the 1988 Accord.  The approach 
employed was to use the 'standardized' approach, (with simplified rules for offsetting positions 
reflecting the more limited Argentine bond market), but with higher risk weights calculated via a 
“value at risk” formula.  The Central Bank publishes the volatilities used to calculate these risk 13 
weights on a monthly basis.  Capital requirements were further augmented in March 1999 with a 
requirement to cover interest rate risk on the banking book. 
  The tequila experience underlined certain structural problems with respect to banking 
oversight, which encouraged new thinking about the benefits of involving markets in the 
regulatory process.  First, although in large part standard statistics monitored by the 
Superintendency do a fairly good job in predicting bank failure, some failures came as a surprise 
to the authorities. Among the reasons why banks failed but were not identified in advance as 
problem institutions is that there is a limit to what reported balance sheet and other statistics tell 
about a bank.  Unsound practices and fraud are an important cause of bank failure, and one that 
is not likely to show itself in reported financial ratios. For example, off-balance sheet contracts 
(types of derivative operations) and even undeclared off-shore banks were uncovered in the 
analysis of some institutions that failed during the tequila crisis.  That observation (along with 
the evidence that market deposit interest rates had been useful in forecasting bank failures during 
the crisis) led policy makers to consider the potential advantages of relying on market 
assessments as part of the regulatory process. In an emerging country context, in particular, 
where supervisory technology and resources are relatively constrained, in some cases the 
“market” knows more about the existence of derivatives and offshore transactions than the 
Superintendency.   
Furthermore, there can also be differences between the powers and incentives of 
regulators and those of markets to discipline banks. An important issue in some emerging market 
countries is the legal powers and the legal protection offered to supervisors who attempt to 
discipline banks. In Argentina, for example, legal protection of supervisors is weak (a point 
made in World Bank 1998), and the legal tradition does not give much scope for early 
Supervisory intervention if an institution is still formally complying with regulations.  There is a 
possibility, therefore, that Supervisors cannot close an institution or force remedial action even if 
they know that an institution is facing serious problems.  In that case,  the market – if it has the 
correct information – may be more willing and able to discipline weak institutions than their  
supervisors
4. 
The B.A.S.I.C. Approach to Bank Regulation 
These kinds of considerations led the regulatory authorities in Argentina to develop what 
has become known in that country as B.A.S.I.C. banking oversight (see Powell 1997 and World 
Bank 1998 for further details).  B.A.S.I.C. is an acronym that stands for Bonds, Auditing, 
Supervision, Information and Credit Rating.  The main idea behind B.A.S.I.C. is that both 
market and regulatory discipline are imperfect and that there are complementarities between the 
two.  As we have argued, the Superintendency and the “market” may have different information 
sets, incentives, and legal powers, and hence the quality of monitoring can be improved if both 
are employed actively to monitor banks. Despite the appeal of the B.A.S.I.C. acronym, the more 
logical order to discuss the operation of the system is: Information, Auditing, Supervision, Bonds 
and Credit Rating.  Table 5 gives a schematic representation of the main policies under each 
heading. 
                                                            
4 See Powell (1997) on this point. 16 
Measures are taken to ensure that the entire database cannot be downloaded.  For 
example, if hundreds of searches are detected from the same source, then further access is 
denied, essentially in an attempt to protect the identity of banks' good creditors from other banks 
(to ensure that banks can internalize the benefits of their own screening and monitoring 
investments).  However, no measures are taken to protect the identity of individual borrowers.  
Moreover, the database, except credits of less than $200,000 in categories 1 and 2 (i.e. 
performing), is sold at very low cost to all interested parties.  The main objectives of this policy 
are not only to promote transparency with respect to the borrowers of the Argentine financial 
system, but also to enhance the 'willingness to pay' debts, given what is perceived as a weak legal 
system.
6The database maintained by the Superintendency has recently been expanded to include 
many more variables (e.g., basic financial ratios of borrowers and other information that would 
be relevant to determining the quality of the loan), and these data are also available for limited 
private use, although comprehensive current data are only available for unlimited private use for 
non-performing borrowers.  
  The usefulness of information depends not only on its quantity and availability, but also 
on its quality. The auditing process is a vital component to ensure the validity of the information 
published.  In Argentina in previous decades auditing firms have been subject to harsh criticism. 
The Central Bank in response has set up a list of qualified bank auditors who must post a 
financial bond.  In the event of a dispute, this bond may be forfeited and the auditor may be 
struck from the authorized list.  Additionally, the Central Bank lays down strict guidelines on 
minimum auditing requirements and supervises the auditing process. 
  “Supervision” in B.A.S.I.C. actually refers to both supervision and regulation (and these 
activities are separated within the internal structure of the Central Bank).  The Superintendency 
has now adopted a version of the U.S. CAMELS system of bank rating.  The banks’ CAMELS 
ratings are then used in several regulations.  In particular the CAMELS score affects capital 
requirements such that banks with poor CAMELS ratings face a higher requirement
7. 
  “Bonds” refers to the requirement that banks in Argentina must issue a subordinated 
liability for some 2% of their deposits each year
8.  The idea behind this kind of regulation (as 
proposed by Calomiris 1997, 1999) is threefold.  First, if banks are forced to attract institutional 
investors and to go to market to issue debt, that process reveals information about the bank to 
those debt-holders and to supervisors. Supervisors may be able to use that information to 
                                                            
6 The database also has great potential to analyze, for example, whether provisioning and capital requirements are 
adequate.  Falkenheim and Powell (1999) use the database and a simple portfolio model of credit risk in this vein 
and conclude that in general provisioning and capital requirements are more than adequate in Argentina given loss 
probabilities (estimated on data for 1998 and 1999). 
7 Argentine capital requirements can be expressed as: CR=11.5*w*X*K+MR+IR where CR is the Capital 
Requirement as a % of assets at risk, w is the average bank Basle risk weight for counterparty risk, X is the average 
interest rate factor (as described in the text, the interest rate on each loan is used as an indicator of counterparty risk), 
K is the CAMELS factor, MR is the market risk capital requirement and IR is the interest rate risk (banking book) 
capital requirement. 
8 In this paper we refer to the “subordinated debt requirement”.  In fact, there are several ways to comply including 
issuing a bond or by holding a deposit/obtaining a loan from certain investors.  These investors must be from outside 
Argentina (and subject to a minimum credit rating) or be local and have already satisfied the requirement.  In the 
case of the bond issue, the bond is not necessarily subordinated to other bonds outstanding although it is always 
subordinate to deposits.  Meeting the stronger requirement allows subordinated debt to be considered as Tier 2 
capital.     17 
discipline the bank. Second, sophisticated  investors that hold a subordinated liability then have 
incentives to monitor the bank, and are likely to be a constituency for conservatism within the 
bank because (like the deposit insurer) their claims are senior to equity.  In contrast, equity 
holders in an insured bank that faces large losses may have incentive to increase risk to take 
advantage of the put option inherent in deposit insurance. Thus when equity capital is severely 
depleted it is not a constituency for conservatism. 
9 Third, if debts are traded publicly, then the 
secondary market prices reveal further information about the default risk of the bank over time.  
In the case of Argentina, where corporate debt markets are extremely thin, it was thought that the 
first two objectives would be more important. 
  The subordinated debt regulation has not performed as well as its advocates had hoped.  
The regulation was adopted in late 1996, to become effective January 1998.  However, over this 
period the Asian crisis struck global capital markets, and Argentina was also affected 
(specifically, after the speculative attack on Hong Kong in October 1997).  Subsequently, 
Argentina’s securities markets suffered further minor shocks as different countries in Asia were 
affected, then suffered considerably in August 1998 as the result of the Russian debt moratorium, 
and then was again shaken by the January 1999 Brazil devaluation.  To summarize, from roughly 
October 1997 to mid-1999, the international financial crisis made debt or equity issues (foreign 
or local) from any issuer (sovereign or corporate) difficult.  The Central Bank reacted to this by 
putting back the compliance date for subordinated debt on several occasions, by extending 
somewhat the range of liabilities that banks could issue in satisfaction of the requirement, and by 
revising the penalties banks faced for non-compliance.   
Currently the regulation remains in force, and banks have a wide range of liabilities that 
qualify as subordinated debt.  Banks that fail to comply face higher capital and liquidity 
requirements. Banks with foreign parents may comply through their parent.   
  To investigate how the subordinated debt regulation has been working in practice, we 
analyze the characteristics of banks according to how they have reacted to this regulation.  In 
particular, in Table 6 we divide banks into two groups according to whether they have complied 
with the regulation and how they have complied.  In a first group we place banks either that do 
not have to comply (an exception is made for foreign owned banks subject to a minimum credit 
rating) or that have complied by issuing a bond or obtaining a 2 year deposit from a foreign 
bank. We call this the “high-compliance” group.   In a second group we place banks that either 
have complied “weakly” by obtaining a 2 year deposit from a local institution (a category that 
includes some banks that subsequently failed), or banks that have not complied at all.  We 
designate these  “low-compliance” banks.  
The identities of the banks in each of these categories are not a matter of public 
information. Some critics have argued that the failure to disclose that information weakens the 
power of subordinated debt to provide signals to the marketplace (i.e. if banks choosing not to 
comply are weaker, then revealing that information could facilitate market discipline of those 
banks).  The decision not to reveal information about banks’ compliance reflected concerns on 
                                                            
9 Bond holders can be depended upon to discipline banks so as to limit their risk taking so long as either (1) equity 
remains in the bank, or alternatively, so long as (2) an upper limit is placed on the yield on any subordinated debt 
that counts toward the regulatory requirement (which it is not the case in Argentina, and which Calomiris 1997  
argues is a weakness of the current law). For more details, see Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2000). 18 
the part of supervisors about creating false impressions about the relative health of banks during 
the turbulent period of 1998-1999. In particular, banks that had issued required subordinated debt 
early (e.g. before the Asian crisis) did not face the same market challenges as those that had 
waited to issue debt, and regulators did not think that relative compliance always reflected 
relative strength. Nevertheless, that lack of confidence in the market’s ability to draw proper 
inferences is somewhat at odds with the motivations for the law in the first place.  
Table 6 compares various characteristics of these two groups to see if the banks that 
comply at a high level are the strongest banks (since one would expect that banks with lower 
default risk would have lower costs of meeting the rigors of market discipline). We report 
variables that capture elements of asset risk and liquidity, as well as market perceptions of the 
default risk on debt, and the capital ratio.  
Default risk on debt is captured alternatively by the average interest cost on debt for the 
bank (which reflects a market risk premium) and by the growth rate of deposits. When banks’ 
deposits are perceived as riskier, they have a harder time attracting deposits (for theory and 
empirical evidence on depositors’ aversion to risky deposits, see Gorton and Pennacchi 1990, 
Calomiris and Kahn 1991, Calomiris and Mason 1997, and Calomiris and Wilson 1998).  19 
 
Table 6.  Subordinated Debt 
      1993.2-1994 1995  1996-1999 
 Deposit Interest Rate   High Compliance  Average 6.16% 8.47% 6.96% 
 (US dollars deposits)   St. Dev.  2.28%  5.33%  3.45% 
  Low Compliance   Average 6.99% 9.98% 7.93% 
   St. Dev.  3.18%  7.16%  2.76% 
          
 Loan Interest Rate    High Compliance  Average 15.40%  16.69%  15.12% 
 (US dollars loans)   St. Dev.  5.63%  6.21%  9.29% 
  Low Compliance  Average 19.02%  20.70%  17.41% 
   St. Dev.  10.94%  11.80%  9.70% 
          
 Change in Deposits   High Compliance  Average 2.43% 0.44% 5.30% 
   St. Dev.  36.8%  31.8%  30.8% 
  Low Compliance  Average 3.58% -1.42%  4.49% 
   St. Dev.  14.6%  61.2%  27.47% 
          
 Capital Ratio    High Compliance  Average 15.97%  17.85%  15.70% 
 (capital integration)   St. Dev.  10.85%  13.98%  12.14% 
  Low Compliance  Average 20.20%  17.37%  18.31% 
   St. Dev.  14.55%  24.75%  16.38% 
          
 Non-Performing Loans   High Compliance  Average 13.29%  16.24%  14.16% 
   St. Dev.  16.04%  16.50%  12.91% 
  Low Compliance  Average 23.10%  30.00%  25.44% 
   St. Dev.  19.25%  22.37%  17.35% 
          
 Loans/Liquid Assets   High Compliance  Average 6.37  6.92  4.16 
   St. Dev.  7.52  6.36  4.06 
  Low Compliance  Average 7.14  9.25  5.39 
   St. Dev.  7.93  10.14  8.42 
          
 Number of Observations   High Compliance   177  237  922 
  Low Compliance   76  97  412 
         
(*) Low Compliance means either the bank did not comply or the bank complied through a local subordinated 
insurance 
 
Asset risk and liquidity differences are captured by (1) the ratio of loans-to-assets (which, 
ceteris paribus, indicates higher risk and lower liquidity), (2) the average interest rate on loans 
(which we view as an indicator of the riskiness of loans), and (3) the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans (another indicator of the riskiness of loans). This way of defining elements of 20 
asset risk isolates three perspectives on asset risk: the proportion of risky assets (loans), the ex 
ante riskiness of loans, and the riskiness of loans based on actual performance.   
Bank default risk reflects a combination of asset risk and leverage.  The inverse of 
leverage (the capital ratio) is measured here using book values (the only available measure, since 
virtually none of the banks has publicly traded stock).  For the various measures of asset risk, 
default risk, and leverage, Table 6 reports data retrospectively for various dates – that is, 
compliance is measured in 1998 and 1999, and data are reported for previous periods for the 
groups defined by their recent compliance.  
The simple comparisons presented in Table 6 indicate that banks that achieved the 
highest degree of compliance with the rule are relatively strong, as indicated by deposit growth 
and deposit interest rate differences (the exception is the lack of a difference in deposit growth 
rates in the pre-tequila period, which predates the subordinated debt regulation  by several years). 
Those differences are also reflected in differences in asset risk, as measured by loan interest 
rates, non-performing loans, and loan-to-asset ratios.  Capital ratios are higher for the banks that 
comply least with the law, which reflects a combination of their asset weakness (i.e. that risk-
based capital standards being enforced) as well as the penalty of a higher capital requirement 
imposed on banks that fail to comply with the rule.  
Despite the fact that not all banks have complied fully with the subordinated debt rule, 
and that there is substantial room for improving the requirement (i.e. disclosing compliance, and 
limiting more what qualifies as subordinated debt), we think the rule can be regarded as a partial 
success for three reasons:  First, compliance patterns with the rule demonstrate the usefulness of 
market discipline.  The fact that weak banks find it difficult to issue subordinated debt, but that 
strong banks find it easy, is encouraging to advocates of the rule who see it as a way to reward 
banks for gaining the confidence of the marketplace.   
Second, banks that fail to comply outright are penalized in ways that reduce the gains that 
banks might otherwise obtain from failing to comply, and that protect against the dangerous 
moral-hazard problem of risk taking (so-called “asset substitution”) in distress states.  By being 
forced to increase capital and liquidity, non-complying banks are not encouraged to increase 
asset risk easily in the face of weakening in their loan quality, which protects the deposit insurer 
and the taxpayer from the risks of extreme loss attendant to the pursuit of “resurrection” 
strategies. 
Third, the law makes it clear to all parties that supervisors are aware of the failure to 
comply with subordinated debt, and this has the benefit of enhancing discipline over supervisors.  
When a weak bank with a long record of failing to comply with the subordinated debt rule fails, 
supervisors cannot claim to have been unaware of the bank’s weakness, since the market was 
providing a clear signal of its lack of confidence in the bank.  While market yields on debt issues 
are one form of signal, the failure to issue subordinated debt is arguably an even stronger one, 
since it indicates that banks would have a very difficult time attracting uninsured long-term debt.  
The presence of the subordinated debt rule thus eliminates ex post “plausible deniability” for 
supervisors – they cannot claim to have been ignorant about bank weakness if that weakness is 
known in the marketplace. 21 
  Finally, the C in B.A.S.I.C. refers to the Credit Rating requirement.  The idea of this 
requirement is also to improve information regarding financial institutions.  While the 
subordinated debt requirement looks to institutional investors to provide discipline and 
information, the idea of a credit rating is to ensure that public information is available to less-
sophisticated investors.  As in the case of the subordinated debt rule, however, this regulatory 
requirement has not proved to be problem-free. 
  The Central Bank first required banks to obtain credit ratings and permitted the ratings to 
be produced by any of a set of authorized agencies, which included local and internationally 
active agencies (8 in all).  However, the perception was that this regime was expensive and that 
the ratings were of varying quality.  In other words, there was a perception that some agencies 
were giving higher ratings than others.  Arguably this reflected the fact that local capital markets 
are still not highly developed; Argentina currently may lack a set of institutional investors 
capable of providing incentives for rating agencies to be conservative.  
The Central Bank initially responded to the problem of questionable ratings quality by 
issuing standardized guidelines for rating agencies to follow.  This did not appear to solve the 
problem.  Finally, the Central Bank asked banks to have only one rating (reducing the cost of the 
regime) but also restricted the authorized agencies to only internationally active ones.  Currently 
there are four authorized rating agencies.
10  We show in Table 7 an estimated transition 
probability matrix of ratings over the history of this regulation.  The table illustrates the 
distribution of current and past ratings, and the probability of obtaining a particular current rating 
given a particular previous rating.  Table 7 shows that most banks enjoy fairly high private 
ratings.  The vast majority of banks rated (89 out of 103) currently enjoy investment grade 
ratings (BBB or higher), and 45 banks are rated AA or AAA.  There have been significant 
changes in ratings for individual banks in both directions during 1998, three of which placed 
banks that had been rated BB, BBB, and A into the F category.  The evidence of such dramatic, 
negative changes in ratings suggests that the ratings are a meaningful signal of quality.  
 
                                                            
10 These agencies are, in alphabetical order, Duff and Phelps, Fitch-IBCA, Standard and Poor's and Thompson 
Bankwatch. Table 7.  Credit Rating Regulation   
Transition Matrix 
            Evaluations in December 98        
  Evaluations  AAA AA  A  BBB BB  B  CCC,  F  Not Orderly  Revoked,  Total 
           CC,  C,  D    Available  Retirement  Suspended   
  AAA  23  1           1   25 
  AA  2  14              1 6  
Evaluations   A    2  28  2      1  2    1 36 
in   BBB     1  13  2    1 1  1  3 22 
December 97   BB       5      1  2    8 
and   B        3      1    4 
March 98   CCC, CC, C, D                0  
  F    1             1  2 
  Not  Available  2         1  4  8   15 
  Total  27  18  29  15  7 3 0 4 10 10  5 128 




Banking System Structure and Performance 
There have also been extremely important structural changes in the Argentine 
financial system since the tequila crisis, which have been facilitated by the policies of 
permitting free entry and encouraging the privatization of public banks.  First, the 
consolidation process begun in the early 1990s, and accelerated by the tequila crisis, has 
continued, as shown in Tables 3 and 4.  As mentioned above, some of these mergers were 
assisted through the use of the Fiduciary Fund set up during 1995 with funds from 
multilateral institutions and some through the use of funds from SEDESA (the deposit 
insurance agency).  Moreover, there was also a strong tendency towards privatization in 
the banking sector, visible in Table 8.  Some 17 of the 24 provincial banks that have been 
privatized were assisted through a Fiduciary Fund set with the assistance of the  
multilaterals (see Appendix Table A1).
11  Privatizations have occurred via a mixture of 
types of sales, and have largely been to existing domestic banks or domestic investment 
groups.  Two very large public banks remain in Argentina – Banco Nación, owned by the 
Federal Government, and Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (the largest Argentine 
province in terms of GDP) –  and efforts to privatize them have met significant political 
resistance.  As of July 1999, these two banks represent some 27% of banking system 
deposits.  Although former President Carlos Menem expressed his desire to privatize 
Banco Nación in his second term, this was not approved by Congress.  The ex-Governor 
of the Province of Buenos Aires (Mr. Duhalde) and his successor (Mr. Ruckhauf) have 
not come out in favor of privatizing this important provincial bank at the time of this 
writing. 
 
Table 8.  Bank Privatization in Argentina 
  Number of  Assets (¹)    Deposits (¹) 
 Institutions  before  after  before  after 
       
1992 - 
1994 
3  1,128   321   562   498  
1995 - 
1996 
11  3,093   1,993   1,706   1,316  
1997 - 
1999 
4  1,442   1,078   1,004   793  
          
Total  18  5,663  3,392   3,273   2,606  
(¹) Assets and deposits after and before privatization, in millions of pesos. 
 
                                                            
11 There have also been a number of privatizations of municipal banks which we do not report here. 25 
  The other very significant structural change in the banking system has been the 
entry of foreign capital.  During 1996 through 1998, several significant transactions took 
place which resulted in the purchase of domestic banks by Spain's Banco Santander and 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, the UK's HSBC and Canada's Bank of Nova Scotia (Scotia 
International) to name a few. Table 9 provides figures on specific transactions.  
Furthermore, Banco Itau from Brazil entered as a start-up, and subsequently also 
purchased a local bank.  These entrants added to several existing foreign banks, including 
Citibank and Bank of Boston, ABM Amro and Lloyds.  Deposits in banks with a foreign 
controlling share now account for some 60% of private sector deposits and some 40% of 
total deposits. Foreign banks have heightened competition, and this is most visible in 
their strong advertising campaigns and, in some products, their willingness to wage price 
wars.
12  Foreign competition has also allowed the introduction of new technology, 
probably more rapidly than otherwise, and has assisted in creating a much more stable 
deposit base. 
 
                                                            
12 There has also been a tendency among some banks to offer bank accounts combined with lotteries, free 
computers and other domestic appliances and even airline tickets.  These marketing campaigns may of 
course reflect an immature market rather than reflecting real competition.  Still, we note that relative to 
international standards, banking services in Argentina tend to be expensive, bank administration costs tend 
to be high, non-performing loans tend to be high and bank profitability is low. 26 
Table 9.  Entry of Foreign Capital 
  Local bank  Purchasing Institution  Origin  Share 
purchased 
        
1-Sep-96  Tornquist  O'Higgins - Central Hispano  Chile - Spain  100% 
1-Dec-96  Francés del Río de la Plata  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV)  Spain  30% 
1-Apr-97  Liniers Sudamericano  BT LA Holdings LLC.  U.S.A.  51% 
1-Jul-97  Trasandino Abinsa  Chile  51% 
1-Jul-97  Crédito de Cuyo  Abinsa  Chile  67% 
1-Jul-97  Banco Río de la Plata  Banco Santander de España  Spain  50% 
1-Aug-97  Banco Roberts  Hong Kong Shangai Banking Corp.  U.K.  100% 
1-Aug-97  Banco de Crdito Argentino  Banco Francés del Río de la Plata (BBV)  Spain  28% 
1-Nov-97  Los Tilos  Caja de Ahorros Prov. San Fernando  Spain  40% 
1-Dec-97  Finvercon  Norwest - Finvercon  U.S.A.  100% 
1-Dec-97  Quilmes Scotia  International  Canada  70% 
1-Jan-98  B.I. Creditanstalt  Bank Austria  Austria  49% 
1-Jul-98  Compañía Financiera Argentina  AIG Consumer Finance Group  U.S.A.  91% 
1-Nov-98  Del Buen Ayre  Banco Itaú  Brazil  100% 
1-Jan-99  Bisel  Caisse Nationale De Credit Agricole  France  36% 
1-May-99  Entre Ríos  Bisel (Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole)  France  82% 
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  To a large extent, this entry of foreign capital in the banking sector is simply a 
reflection of what has happened in the Argentine economy more generally.  In fact the 
puzzle is really why this did not happen earlier given that the sector was liberalized in 
1992.  As noted before, one hypothesis is that foreign investors were waiting to see that 
the new policy regime was “fully tested” before making significant investments.  It is 
worth noting that investors in the financial system were unusually late in entering 
compared to investors in telephones, electricity, gas, water, railways, mining and 
petrochemicals. That difference in timing suggests that potential bank investors had 
specific policy concerns that did not affect other sectors.  In particular, they may have 
wished to see proof that the government respected the independence of the Central Bank 
as a regulator and a monetary agency, and that the government would not appropriate 
resources from the banking sector during a period of stress – e.g. by freezing deposits as 
had been done in 1990.  According to that interpretation, after the tequila “test”, these 
investors were more willing to come in. 
Despite the dynamism in Argentine banking, bank profitability remains very low 
by international standards, which is partly a result of regulations that create incentives for 
banks to limit their risk, and partly reflects the high operating costs of banks in 
Argentina. Table 10 gives a breakdown of the profitability of the Argentine banking 
system in the last three years for public banks, private banks and the top 10 private banks.  
Even in the top 10 private banks, it can be seen that costs remain high (almost 6% of 
assets), and although service income is relatively high, loan-loss charges are also high (at 
around 2% of assets this year) reducing profits to less than 1% of assets.  Other private 
banks are less profitable (0.5% of assets) with higher operating costs (6.4% of assets) and 
public banks show lower interest margin (3.5% of assets as opposed to 4.5% for top 10 
private banks).  Public bank profitability also remains low at 0.4% of assets. 
 Table 10.  Breakdown of Banks Profitability 
Annualized, in percentage of net assets 
          
  Public Banks    Private Banks    Top Ten Private   
  1997  1998  1999 (¹)  1997  1998  1999 (¹)  1997  1998  1999 (¹) 
           
Interest margin  3.9 3.9 3.5 3.9  4.7 4.6  4.0  4.5 4.5 
Service income margin  2.8 2.8 2.5 3.6  3.3 3.1  3.4  3.1 2.9 
Gains on securities  0.4 0.6 0.6 1.3  0.8 1.0  1.4  0.6 0.9 
Operating costs  -5.5 -5.5 -4.9 -6.8  -6.6 -6.4  -6.3  -6.0 -5.8 
Loan-loss charges  -2.8 -1.2 -1.3 -1.9  -1.8 -2.1  -1.8  -1.5 -2.1 
Tax charges  -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5  -0.4 -0.4  -0.5  -0.4 -0.4 
Income tax  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4  -0.4 -0.4  -0.4  -0.3 -0.5 
Other  2.6 0.3 0.4 1.5  1.0 1.2  1.7  1.0 1.2 
              
Total profits  1.1 0.6 0.4 0.8  0.5 0.5  1.5  0.9 0.8 
(¹) Up to September 1999. 




The combination of low earnings and high recent acquisition prices is interesting. 
Projecting current levels of profits into the future would appear not to justify the prices 
paid for recent acquisitions.  Thus, in order to explain these prices, one would have to 
assume a high forecasted growth rate for the financial system. If those growth forecasts 
do not materialize it is possibile that some foreign entrants may reassess their decisions to 
enter the Argentine market in the years to come (we note in passing the decision of 
Deutshe Bank to sell its Argentine retail business to Bank of Boston as an example of 
foreign exit).  On the other hand, if high growth rates resume, the foreign acquisitions of 
the 1990s could prove quite successful.  
What are the prospects for further improvement in the structure and performance 
of the Argentine banking industry, and what are the risks posed to the system from  
delaying those improvements? The World Bank (1998) report suggests that the problems 
of the remaining weak private institutions and the remaining public institutions are quite 
distinct, and that neither is a systemic threat or a cause for urgent concern. The World 
Bank (1988) suggests that the weaker private institutions – because of their small relative 
size – pose no threat to the stability of the financial system more generally.  The 
remaining public banks, it was argued, also present no threat to the system (because of 
their separateness from the private sector) but might well present significant fiscal cost if 
they were to be privatized today (presumably the authors had in mind a significant clean-
up of the public banks’ balance sheets). 
In the eyes of investors the reforms in the financial system in the late 1990s  
appear to have produced a very clear positive result.  From 1996 to 1998, the financial 
system grew very strongly with deposits growing at a roughly 30% annualized rate.  In 
the second half of 1998, however, and through 1999, Argentina fell into a recession (due 
to the combination of external factors (high international lending spreads for emerging 
economies, sharp falls in commodity prices, a high value of the dollar, and a recession in 
Brazil) and internal factors (political uncertainty leading up to the October 1999 
Presidential election).  That recession has taken its toll on the banking system.  While 
deposits have kept growing (at just over 10% for the year), credit to the private sector has 
grown very little over the last 18 months and interest rates have generally risen, 
depending on the sub-period analyzed.  Non-performing loans have also risen quite 
significantly, and thus profitability has suffered.   
Although the past year has been a very difficult time in some sectors of the real 
economy, the banking sector has been very stable.  Indeed, the fact that credit supply has 
tightened in the face of a recession and high loan losses is precisely what one would 
expect from a banking system subject to market discipline. In that sense, tight credit 
supply is a sign of the financial system’s strength (Calomiris and Wilson 1998).
13 There 
                                                            
13 Some observers argue that market discipline is undesirable because it reduces the supply of credit during 
downturns and thus exacerbates recessions.  We see that effect as unavoidable, and attempts to mitigate 
market discipline with regulatory “forbearance” as counter-productive.  When regulators forbear – in order 
to permit banks to undertake greater risk than the market would permit – some (especially insolvent) banks 
will abuse forbearance by undertaking enormous risk as part of a resurrection strategy.  These bets (e.g. in 28 
has been no capital flight from the banking system whatsoever and no capital flight from 
the country (reserves in fact have risen).  Thus, the financial system, which had always 
been an Achilles' heel for Argentina, recently has contributed to the long-run credibility 
of fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policy, and thus despite the tightness of credit, has 
contributed to macroeconomic stability.   
 
Table 11.  Comparison of Two Crises 
  Tequila  Oct-97 to 
Feb-99 
Deposits growth  -18% 19% 
Reserves growth  -30% 14% 
Max. rise in interest 
rates (¹) 
12.1 7.9 
(¹) Percentage points increase. 
  
 
As Table 11 shows, the reaction by Argentine bank depositors to the recent period 
of emerging market upheaval (as measured by deposit growth) is strikingly different from 
the tequila period, despite the fact that the recent upheaval (in Brazil) has had larger 
fundamental consequences for the Argentine economy than did the collapse of the 
Mexican peso in 1994-1995. Not only have deposit growth and international reserves 
growth remained strong, interest rises have not risen by nearly as much as they did during 
the tequila period. 
 
III.  Is Market Discipline Real? Microeconomic Evidence 
  In this section we take a more formal look at the evidence that market discipline 
operates on Argentine banks.  We define market discipline as reactions of private debt 
holders to bank actions such that the bank is penalized for increasing the default risk on 
its debt, either by a higher risk premium on debt, or by the withdrawal of debt.  
  There is now a large empirical literature summarizing evidence on the existence 
of market discipline in banking in a variety of contexts.  In the U.S., that literature 
focuses on the usefulness of certificate of deposit yields for predicting bank problems 
(Baer and Brewer 1986, Berger, Davies, and Flannery 1998, Flannery, 1998, Jagtiani, 
Kaufman, and Lemieux 1999, Morgan and Stiroh 1999), while in developing countries, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
foreign exchange markets) often have large negative expected returns and produce enormous losses to 
taxpayers.  Indeed, the credit contraction attendant to a banking collapse, and the fiscal costs of financing 
those bailouts – both of which are apparent in Mexico recently – can produce a much worse cyclical drag 
on the economy than market discipline on banks.  For further discussion of these macroeconomic costs, see 
Caprio and Klingabiel (1996). 29 
the empirical focus is on the predictability of deposit interest rates and the contraction of 
deposits (Peria and Schmukler 1999).  Calomiris and Mason (1997) and Calomiris and 
Wilson (1998) show that during the interwar period in the United States, weak banks 
(measured either by their probability of failure or by their implied risk of default on debt 
from an asset-pricing model) were forced to pay higher interest and suffered larger 
deposit outflows than other banks. 
  As we discussed above, several studies of the recent Argentine experience have 
linked ex ante bank risk with ex ante interest charges and deposit outflows, and ex post 
bank failure (Schumacher 1997, Dabos and Sosa 1999, Anastasi, Burdisso, Grubisic, and 
Lencioni 1998, and D'Amato, Grubisic and Powell 1997). Banks with high deposit 
interest rates and high observable asset risk were more likely to fail during the tequila 
crisis and afterward, and lost a greater proportion of deposits than other banks. Thus there 
is already substantial evidence of the operation of market discipline within the Argentine 
banking system. 
  Our approach to measuring market discipline focuses on links between observable 
characteristics of banks (related to asset risk and leverage), on the one hand, and market 
reactions to those characteristics as captured in market pricing of deposit risk and 
contractions in the volume of deposits.  A banking system in which market discipline is 
an important constraining force on bank risk taking should display three characteristics. 
First, market measures of, and reactions to, deposit default risk should vary across banks.  
A banking system in which depositors do not distinguish among banks is one in which 
market discipline is unlikely to exist.  Second, differences in deposit interest rates and 
deposit growth across banks should reflect differences in bank asset risk and leverage  
which, according to economic theory, should be the sources of deposit default risk.  
Third, depositor discipline should constrain default risk on deposits.  Recent 
models of banking that emphasize either the liquidity services of bank deposits (as in 
Gorton and Pennacchi 1990) or “delegated monitoring” of bank borrowers (as in 
Calomiris and Kahn 1991) emphasize that depositors do not simply price default risk, but 
also act to limit it.  That is, bank depositors are not only risk-averse, but also “risk-
intolerant” (Calomiris and Wilson 1998).  As the level of default risk on deposits 
increases, deposits become less liquid, and the agency problems inherent in delegated 
monitoring become magnified.  Both of these problems lead to a type of quantity 
rationing where depositors withdraw their deposits from risky banks, which acts as a 
source of discipline over bank risk taking.  These arguments imply that increases in 
default risk caused by adverse shocks to bank asset risk and capital should be mean-
reverting.  Banks that suffer those shocks face a strong incentive to reduce asset risk or 
increase capital to avoid disciplinary withdrawals of funds by depositors. 
  Our discussion of microeconomic evidence has three parts.  First, we begin by 
summarizing the evidence on the extent of cross-sectional heterogeneity in the banking 
system, with special attention to the heterogeneity in deposit interest rates and flows (our 
measures of market discipline) during different sub-periods.  Second, we test a model that 
relates these two market discipline measures to bank leverage and asset risk measures.  
That is, according to finance theory (e.g. the Black-Scholes model) default risk should be 30 
an increasing function both of asset risk and leverage. In light of that theory, we test to 
see whether our panel data set displays observable links that confirm the presence of 
market discipline in bank debt markets.  Third, if depositors are “risk-intolerant,”  then 
increases in deposit interest rates in response to increased risk should be reversed over 
time, as banks are forced to reduce asset risk and leverage to meet depositors’ preferences 
for low risk.  As a first step to testing that theory, we provide some simple tests of mean 
reversion in deposit interest rates.  
Market Discipline and Bank Heterogeneity 
  Tables 12-15 provide summary statistics for our measures of asset risk, default 
risk, leverage, and deposit growth.  These are provided for separate sub-periods, and for 
different sets of financial institutions.  Interest rates on loans and deposits are measured 
in these tables as premia over the rates of a benchmark, low-interest rate group of foreign 
retail banks, to facilitate a comparison of spreads across sub-periods.  Our measure of 
deposit interest rates converts interest rates on peso-denominated deposits into dollar 
equivalent yields using the interest rate parity condition for riskless assets (proxied by 
Citibank’s interest rate spread) to construct dollar-equivalent yields for peso-denominated 
deposits.  
The main usefulness of these tables is to (1) indicate the extent of heterogeneity in 
the reactions of markets to banks (deposit growth and deposit interest rates), (2) describe 
the average changes over time in measures of asset risk, leverage, deposit growth, and 
deposit risk premia, and (3) explore links over time between average bank asset risk and 
leverage, on the one hand, and average deposit growth and default risk premia on debt, on 
the other hand.  A perusal of these tables clearly indicates the pronounced heterogeneity 
in deposit interest rates and deposit growth, the variation in average performance over 
time (reflecting the tumult of the 1990s), and the correspondence among measures of 
asset risk, leverage, deposit interest rates, and deposit growth.We return to those 
connections among asset risk, leverage, and market discipline in our regression analysis 
below. 
These tables also provide some evidence on how links among asset risk, leverage, 
and market discipline  differ across types of institutions.  For example, to the extent that 
public banks are protected from the risk of insolvency by their sponsoring governments, 
depositors in those public banks may not penalize asset risk and leverage as much.  If that 
were true, then public bank weakness would not be as evident in deposit interest rate 
premia or in lower deposit growth. The tables lend some support for that view.  Note, for 
example, that during the tequila crisis (Table 13), non-performing loan ratios for public 
banks were very high, but deposit interest rates remained very low. 
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Table 12.  Pre-Tequila Banking System Heterogeneity 1994.2-1994.4 
  All Institutions  Private Domestic  Private Domestic  Foreign Retail  Foreign Wholesale 
       Retail  Wholesale        
Variables  Avg. Med. Std.  Avg. Med. Std.  Avg. Med. Std.  Avg. Med. Std.  Avg. Med. Std. 
                 
Id  -  avg.Idf*  2.21 2.39 2.77 2.42 2.52 1.73 1.51 1.57 2.02  -  -  - 3.02  1.4 4.89 
                 
Il  -  avg.  Ilf*  5.15 4.38 7.21 4.54  4.6 3.65  2.3 1.21 5.32  -  -  - 0.51 -0.5 6.57 
                 
Npl/loans  14.22 9.96  13.74  11.43 9.89 6.71 5.68 4.61 7.95 8.08 8.24  4  11.36 5.92  14.05 
                 
Loans/Assets  69.37 72.74 28.69 70.78 72.78 11.08 43.15 42.56 21.19 70.41 72.51 10.29 46.34 49.58 26.47 
                 
Capital/Assets  16.98 13.47 12.09 14.06 12.39  6.45 16.65 10.73 21.98 13.43 12.28  4.18 24.97 24.31 13.99 
                 
D e p . G r o w t h                  
1994.2-
1994.4 
3.69 3.34  17.24 4.18 3.39 9.58 5.29 3.41  20.04 2.46 5.68  16.14 4.15 1.67  40.88 
Number  Obs.  497    124    44    36    36   
 
 
               
  Provincial Public  National Public  Finance Companies  Cooperative 
  Avg. Med. Std. Avg. Med. Std. Avg. Med. Std. Avg. Med. Std. 
Variables              
              
Id  -  avg.Idf 0.57 0.41 2.76 0.08  -0.16 0.51 3.22 3.74 2.84  3.5  3.3 2.27 
Il  -  avg.  Ilf 4.82  3  10.41 8.28 6.39 8.42  10.28 9.92 9.36 6.54 6.78 3.77 
Npl/loans  34.06 29.21 21.27 17.93 13.94  9.58 10.96  9.34  6.99 12.35 10.49  6.49 
Loans/Assets  90.33 78.12 54.62 76.33 79.04 12.49 71.63 78.26 20.88 74.31 74.96  7.66 
Capital/Assets 13.46 12.37 11.69  11.1 10.35  1.64 23.45 19.73 13.57 17.08 15.09  7.93 
D e p . G r o w t h               
1994.2-
1994.4 
2.08 0.96  10.36  -0.11 0.53 5.46  3.3 3.06  23.25 4.53 4.37  7.1 
Number  Obs.  75    9    70    103   
* Id is deposit interest rate.  Idf is deposit interest rate for foreign retail banks.  Il is loan interest rate.  Ilf is loan interest rate for 




Table 13 - Tequila Crisis Banking System Heterogeneity - 1995.1-1995.4 period 
                 
  All Institutions    Private Domestic    Private Domestic    Foreign Retail    Foreign Wholesale   
       Retail     Wholesale         
 Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. 
Varibles                 
                
Id  -  avg.Idf*  2.8  2 6.38 3.91 3.01 6.26 2.88  2.4 5.04  -  -  - 2.78  -0.35  12.29 
                
Il  -  avg.  Ilf*  3.9  2.6 7.69 3.77 3.14 4.27 4.23  2.5 7.03  -  -  -  1.7  -0.54 9.34 
                   
Npl/loans  20.61  16.18  17.75  18.95  16.58  13.58  11.21 7.04  11.33 9.41 8.84 4.57 9.05 2.86 1.34 
                 
Loans/Assets  69.21  73 30.95  71.7 74.84 15.24 47.48 46.88 24.98 71.15  71.8  8.33 43.84 40.78 27.04 
                 
Capital/Assets 18.54 14.78 17.12 16.03 13.47  9.61 24.95 19.42 18.54 13.71 12.31  4.8 27.59 22.86  18 
                 
Number  Obs.  536    152    61    47    58   
                
D e p . G r o w t h                 
1994.4-1995.4  -2.25 0.34  26.65  -1.46 1.07  21.11 -3.8 -2.2  38.71 2.24 4.48  15.66 5.25 4.97  44.39 
                 
Number  Obs.  593    160    70    56    65   
 
 
               
  Provincial Public    National Public    Finance Companies    Cooperative   
              
 Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. 
Variables              
             
Id  -  avg.Idf  0.02  -0.32 3.85  -0.08  -0.05 2.57 5.88 4.78 6.76 4.02 3.64  3 
             
Il  -  avg.  Ilf  3.48  0.5 13.7 3.65 2.52 6.39 6.43 6.31  6.3 5.07 5.46 3.89 
              
Npl/loans  43.63 40.37 22.62 23.37 17.96  9.16 22.01 18.17 12.05 19.27 17.87  8.93 
              
Loans/Assets  89.86 83.48  54.5 73.18 74.71  9.75 69.16 75.57 24.83 76.75 77.51  8.42 
              
Capital/Assets  9.66 10.49 24.51 17.89  9.67 23.27  25.5  22.8 18.69 20.14 18.65  9.6 
              
Number  Obs.  84    18    53    63   
             
D e p . G r o w t h              
1994.4-1995.4 -4.1  -2.58  13.07  0.1 1.99 8.15  -12.96 -7.4 30.4  -1.52 0.07 18.7 
              
Number  Obs.  108    17    61    56   
             
* Id is deposit interest rate.  Idf is deposit interest rate for foreign retail banks.  Il is loan interest rate.  Ilf is loan interest rate for foreign retail banks.  Interest rates are expressed in dollar-equivalent units.  33 
 
Table 14 - Inmediate Post-Tequila Banking System Heterogeneity 1996.1-1997.2 
  All Institutions    Private Domestic    Private Domestic    Foreign Retail    Foreign Wholesale   
       R e t a i l      W h o l e s a l e           
 Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. 
Variables                  
                 
Id  -  avg.Idf*  1.82 1.65 5.13 1.92 1.98 4.04 2.76 2.58 2.84  -  -  - 0.79 0.86  6.73 
                 
Il  -  avg.  Ilf*  4.67 3.29 7.09 4.87 3.51 7.25 4.73 3.41 6.78  -  -  - 2.52 0.49  7.76 
                  
Npl/loans  20.54 16.57 17.43 22.15 18.53 16.25 16.33 11.38 16.62 10.24  9.71  6.45 11.51  5.28  14.74 
                  
Loans/Assets  60.10 62.55 20.73 59.74 60.82 18.04 55.61 59.23 18.25 58.22 62.77 16.66 44.10 41.73  26.27 
                  
Capital/Assets  17.11 12.89 15.41 12.54 11.43 11.64 18.35 15.06 13.57 12.42 11.47  4.56 28.26 18.96  20.71 
                  
Number  Obs.  649    181    52    115    72    
                 
Dep.Growth  7.05 5.94  22.62 6.75 6.40  16.44  11.95 8.51  24.47 7.51 6.02 9.97 9.73 6.06  36.45 
1995.4-1997.2                  
                  
Number  Obs.  854    286    89    77    100    
                 
                 
  Provincial Public    National Public    Finance Companies    Cooperative         
                   
 Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std.       
Variables                  
                 
Id  -  avg.Idf  0.28 0.84 5.17 0.03 0.04 0.54 4.04 4.60 7.92 2.66 2.74 1.56       
                 
Il  -  avg.  Ilf  3.21 1.39 8.36 5.95 7.41 3.93 8.60 8.06 7.53 6.34 6.39 3.01       
                  
Npl/loans  45.13 44.55 22.58 20.10 20.11  2.31 19.80 15.73 11.25 22.48 21.50  8.86       
                  
Loans/Assets  69.79 62.83 27.06 63.11 62.69  6.35 68.22 69.00 18.25 62.21 63.18  6.99       
                  
Capital/Assets  11.87  8.77 20.25  9.22  7.97  2.78 26.47 20.73 16.43 17.91 14.63  9.15       
                  
Number  Obs.  72    16    103    38       
                 
Dep.Growth  2.48 4.06  28.69 4.68 3.44  10.34 5.74 6.02  23.33 8.57 7.51 8.86       
1995.4-1997.2                  
                  
Number  Obs.  114    23    116    49       
                 
* Id is deposit interest rate.  Idf is deposit interest rate for foreign retail banks.  Il is loan interest rate.  Ilf is loan interest rate for foreign retail banks.  Interest rates are expressed in dollar-equivalent 
units.  34 
Table 15 - Post-Asian Crisis Banking System Heterogeneity 1997.3-1999.1 
                  
  All Institutions    Private Domestic    Private Domestic    Foreign Retail    Foreign Wholesale   
       R e t a i l      W h o l e s a l e           
 Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. 
Variables                  
                 
Id  -  avg.Idf*  1.47 0.97 3.48 1.14 1.08 2.01 2.18 1.98 2.00  -  -  - 1.55  -0.05  6.41 
                 
Il  -  avg.  Ilf*  4.09 2.26 7.02 4.77 3.44 6.44 2.70 1.90 5.99  -  -  - 1.33 0.01  5.36 
                  
Npl/loans  17.5  13.85  15.48 9.00  14.31  10.20  19.39 9.57  10.26 9.69 8.68 6.76 7.99 3.54  12.24 
                  
Loans/Assets  55.53 58.11 21.17 54.25 57.44 14.80 61.33 60.54 14.73 51.89 54.85 15.42 36.47 29.32  26.77 
                  
Capital/Assets  16.86 12.10 13.84 12.98 11.23  7.16 18.27 17.64  7.14 11.14 10.16  4.67 25.27 12.74  24.27 
                  
Number  Obs.  811    227    61    161    94    
                 
Dep.Growth  2.46 1.82  17.73 1.78 1.10  12.45 0.16  -0.71  19.36 4.68 4.15  12.35 4.75 3.90  30.16 
1997.3-1999.1                  
                  
Number  Obs.  772    201    59    159    90    
                 
                 
  Provincial Public    National Public    Finance Companies    Cooperative   
              
 Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. Avg. Med.  Std. 
Variables              
             
Id  -  avg.Idf  0.77 0.72 2.65  -0.94  -0.39 1.22 3.65 3.35 4.63 1.71 1.81 1.61 
             
Il  -  avg.  Ilf  2.29 1.45 6.56 5.68 0.55 9.64  8.2 7.64 9.19 3.39 3.67 3.45 
              
Npl/loans  41.97 43.38 21.42 21.45 21.18  2.88 20.47 16.96 12.83 23.64 23.04  8.11 
              
Loans/Assets  55.24 55.34 17.89 58.87 59.29 10.55 71.15 67.05 17.79 59.11 61.12  5.35 
              
Capital/Assets  10.34  9.49 11.38  8.00  7.98  1.51 26.62 23.92 14.40 18.15 14.35  8.4 
              
Number  Obs.  68    21    140    39   
             
Dep.Growth  0.69 1.12  10.50 3.74 3.64 4.48 1.42 0.70  22.44 1.02 2.45 7.75 
1997.3-1999.1              
              
Number  Obs.  68    21    146    28   
                 
* Id is deposit interest rate.  Idf is deposit interest rate for foreign retail banks.  Il is loan interest rate.  Ilf is loan interest rate for foreign retail banks.  Interest rates are expressed in dollar-equivalent units.  
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Fundamental Determinants of Market Assessments of Bank Liability Risk 
  Next, we turn to a regression analysis of market discipline as a reaction to deposit 
risk, as measured either by the interest rate on deposits or by the outflow of deposits.  The 
basic model regresses either of these two dependent variables on our three measures of 
asset risk (loans/other assets, non-performing loans/loans, and the loan interest rate), a 
measure of the liquidity of non-loan assets (cash/government bonds), and the (book) 
capital ratio.  We used lagged capital ratios to avoid correlation by construction between 
deposit growth and the capital ratio. Other independent variables are taken as exogenous 
within the quarter in which deposit growth or deposit interest rates are set.   
We report a variety of regression specifications, including OLS, fixed firm and 
time effects, and random effects.  We ran the regressions for different time periods and 
for different samples (sometimes including all banks, sometimes confining the sample to 
private commercial banks).  Our results were generally robust to alternative 
specifications, although results were stronger when we restricted our sample to private 
commercial banks.  The restrictions imposed by random effects (the orthogonality of 
regressors with firm and time effects) passed Hausman’s test in some cases, and in those 
cases, random-effects estimation is more efficient. In Tables 16 and 17 we report a subset 
of our results for the deposit growth and deposit interest rate regressions. Specifically, we 
report OLS, fixed effects, and random effects specifications for the “restricted sample” of 
private commercial banks, for the entire period. 36 
Table 16 
 
Panel Regression Analysis of Bank Deposit Growth Rates 
Sample Restricted to Private Commercial Banks 
Quarterly Observations, 1993:3-1999:1 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
    
 
                 OLS                  Fixed        Random 
                                         Firm/Time        Effects 
        E f f e c t s  
 
                 (1)              (2)                 (3)               
Variables 
 
Constant     0.018    0.018             0.042 
                   (0.019)              (0.031)       (0.027) 
 
Lagged Capital Ratio      0.296      0.326         0.277 
                   (0.064)              (0.087)       (0.074) 
 
Loan Interest Rate               -0.418              -0.190        -0.254 
                   (0.106)             (0.153)        (0.121) 
 
Loans/Other Assets               -0.0047             -0.0028       -0.0032 
                   (0.0006)            (0.0008)       (0.0007) 
 
Cash/Government Bonds              0.0000     0.0000      -0.0000 
                   (0.0002)             (0.0002)     (0.0002) 
 
Non-Performing Loans/ Loans          -0.059      0.025       -0.060 
                   (0.051)              (0.079)      (0.060) 
 
 
Adjusted  R-Squared    0.082    0.325          
 
P-Value  for  Hausman  Test              0.309
* 
 
Number of Observations    1,138      1,138       1,138 
 
 
* The restrictions of the random-effects model are not rejected, implying that the random-
effects estimator is preferred. 37 
Table 17 
 
Panel Regression Analysis of Bank Deposit Interest Rates 
Sample Restricted to Private Commercial Banks 
Quarterly Observations, 1993:3-1999:1 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
                OLS                   Fixed        Random 
                                         Firm/Time        Effects 
                         Effects 
 




Constant     0.036    0.060             0.058 
                   (0.002)              (0.003)       (0.004) 
 
Lagged Capital Ratio      0.035               0.009         0.019 
                   (0.008)              (0.009)       (0.008) 
 
Loan Interest Rate      0.142      0.086         0.101 
                   (0.013)              (0.015)       (0.014) 
 
Loans/Other Assets      0.00085    0.00034       0.00046 
                   (0.00007)             (0.00008)      (0.00007) 
 
Cash/Government Bonds            -0.00002    0.00000      -0.00000 
                  (0.00003)             (0.00002)      (0.00002) 
 
Non-Performing Loans/ Loans            0.038              -0.0205       -0.007 
                   (0.006)             (0.0079)       (0.007) 
 
 
Adjusted  R-Squared    0.269    0.638            
 
P-Value for Hausman Test                   0.000
* 
 
Number of Observations    1,138      1,138        1,138 
 
* The restrictions of the random-effects model are rejected, implying that the fixed-effects 




Both deposit growth and deposit interest rates reflect fundamental cross-sectional 
differences in our measures of asset risk.  Higher asset risk and leverage are associated 
with depositor discipline in the form of greater deposit withdrawals, and high asset risk 
also is reflected in higher interest rates on deposits.   
Not all the measures of asset risk have the predicted impacts on interest rates and 
deposit growth in the regressions. The loan interest rate and loan ratio enter significantly 
and with the right sign in all regressions, while non-performing loans and the ratio of 
cash to government bonds are either insignificant, or (in the case of the non-performing 
loans) switch signs across specifications.  
Interestingly, the effect of the capital ratio is of the expected sign for deposit 
growth (positive), but contrary to our expectation, is also positive (sometimes 
insignificantly) for the deposit interest rate.  One way to explain the differences in the 
capital ratio effect between Tables 16 and 17 is to recall that capital ratios are an 
endogenous variable chosen by the bank.  Even though the capital ratio is lagged (to 
mitigate the endogeneity problem) it is possible that banks anticipate interest rate changes 
in their deposits one quarter ahead and alter capital ratios to compensate for  anticipated 
increases in default risk.   
Does Market Discipline Encourage Prudent Risk Management? 
  The regressions reported in Tables 16 and 17 do not describe the dynamic 
responses of banks’ to market discipline. For example, the regressions do not examine 
whether increases in default risk on debt produce reductions in loan-to-asset ratios, or 
loan risk, or increases in the ratio of cash to bonds.  To accomplish this result, one would 
have to specify a dynamic system of equations (possibly, a panel VAR model), which 
requires strong assumptions about the relative endogeneity, and the adjustment 
frequencies, of our various measures of asset risk, deposit risk, deposit growth, and 
capital accumulation. We have already argued that this is treacherous ground; for 
example, our initial assumption about the exogeneity of capital ratios to interest rate 
changes is suspect (especially given our findings of a positive partial correlation between 
deposit interest rates and capital ratios in Table 17).  
While we think a panel VAR approach to this problem may be promising in future 
research, here we pursue a simpler approach. We examine whether there is a  tendency 
for individual banks’ deposit interest rates to revert to their mean, and whether the speed 
of mean reversion has changed over time. If depositor discipline forces banks to react to 
increases in their debt default risk, then high levels of default risk should prompt  
reductions in interest rates in the future.  We test that proposition using a simple model of 
the time series properties of individual banks’ interest rates, and we report our results in 





Deposit Interest Rate Mean Reversion 
Dependent Variable: Change in Deposit Interest Rate 
All Financial Institutions 
Quarterly Observations, 1993:3-1999:1 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
                     (1)         (2)              (3)          (4) 
 
       1993:3-1994:4        1995:1-1996:2   1996:3-1997:4        1997:4-1999:1 
 
 
ri, t-1          -1.04       -1.06            -1.04       -1.29 













* All regressions include fixed firm and time effects, which are not reported here. 




The “fixed-effects” approach to examining mean reversion holds firm and time 
effects constant and constrains all banks to react similarly to a change in their deposit 
interest rate.  Alternatively, we also estimated the relationship using a “random-
coefficients” approach, which takes advantage of the opportunity to see whether banks 
differ in the extent to which their deposit interest rates revert to the mean.  As the results 
for these two models were quite similar, we only report the “fixed effects” results in 
Table 18. 
As we discussed at length above, regulatory and supervisory monitoring and 
discipline has improved markedly in Argentina over the period 1992-1999.  In Table 18, 
we investigate whether the speed of mean reversion has increased over time.  
Specifically, we report results for several sub-periods (1993 Q3 to 1994 Q4, 1995 Q1 to 
1996 Q2, 1996 Q3 to 1997 Q4, and 1997 Q4 to 1999 Q1). 
The regression we run for each sub-period is: 
∆ rit = c + α  rit-1 + bi + ft + ε it  . 
∆ r is the change in the liability interest rate, b and f are fixed firm and time 
effects, and ε  is an error term.  The i and t subscripts refer to individual banks and time. 
α  , which we expect to be negative, measures the speed at which the interest rate “mean 
reverts.”  If interest rates revert by 100% in just one quarter then we expect the α  
coefficient to be -1 whereas if there is no reversion at all, then we expect the α  coefficient 
to be zero.  We then compare the distribution of the α  coefficients (across banks) for the 
sub-periods.
14 
We find that mean reversion is rapid.  Within-firm mean reversion occurs within 
one quarter (α  is –1 or smaller) in all sub-periods.  The most recent period, which has 
witnessed the implementation of the B.A.S.I.C. plan, shows a significantly higher rate of 
mean reversion (a coefficient value of -1.29), which is consistent with the view that banks 
face stronger incentives to resolve problems of high default risk in the more recent 
period. It is difficult to interpret a coefficient size less than –1 (which seems to imply 
greater than mean reversion of interest rates).  In specifications without fixed time 
effects, coefficient sizes tended to be smaller (typically in the range of –0.6 to –0.8).  
Thus we suspect that correlation between average time effects and individual banks’ 
sensitivities to aggregate shocks may explain the apparent over-adjustment of rates.  
 
To summarize our empirical results, we find significant cross-sectional 
differences in market reactions to bank default risk (as measured by deposit interest rates 
and deposit growth), and our regressions indicate links between those measures and 
fundamental characteristics of banks related to asset risk and leverage.  Furthermore, 
deposit interest rates mean revert very quickly (holding fixed effects and time effects 
constant), and the rate of mean reversion has increased during the period in which the 
B.A.S.I.C. framework was implemented.  Overall, these results suggest that market 
                                                            
14 We also ran regressions excluding fixed firm effects, which constrains all firms to target the same long-
run average level of interest rates. Fixed effects have a great deal of explanatory power (raising the adjusted 
R-squared substantially in all sub-periods), and so we only report fixed-effects results in Table 18.  In 
specifications without fixed effects, coefficients on the lagged interest rate were smaller, but the same 
pattern of increasing coefficient size over time appeared, and was even large in magnitude than the 
differences reported in Table 18.   41 
discipline is present in measuring bank risk, punishing it, and successfully encouraging 
banks to pursue risk-management policies that reduce risk after they suffer risk-




  In this chapter, we reviewed the Argentine experience in the 1990s with bank 
regulatory reform, which has been one of the most determined efforts, among emerging 
market countries, to inject credible market discipline into the relationship between banks 
and depositors, and into the regulatory and supervisory process. We have argued that 
Argentina successfully implemented a system of bank regulation that achieved credible 
market discipline over banks. Markets, as well as regulators, punish or reward banks 
depending on the perceived risk of bank failure, and market perceptions of risk (as 
indicated in deposit interest rates and deposit flows) are correlated both with ex ante 
measures of fundamental asset risk and with ex post incidence of bank failure. Market 
discipline encourages rapid, risk-reducing adjustments by banks to shocks that raise their 
risk of failure. 
  Despite these favorable findings, clearly there is room for improvement in 
Argentina’s bank regulation regime.  First, the privatization of public banks remains 
unfinished, most notably in the cases of the two largest public banks, which account for 
more than a quarter of banking system deposits.  Second, the least-cost resolution 
mandate that has been given SEDESA thus far has not proved very costly, but it could 
become a slippery slope – a means to pay for implicit bank bailouts, and thus undermine 
the hard-won gains of market confidence and market discipline.  Limits to the 
subsidization of acquisitions that prevent least-cost resolution from becoming an implicit 
bailout mechanism are, therefore, a potentially important area for reform.  Finally, the 
subordinated debt law also could be improved.  Disclosing banks’ compliance with the 
law seems a desirable first step.  Placing greater limits on what qualifies as compliance 
(in particular, excluding domestic interbank deposits from the definition of qualifying 
subordinated debt and ensuring that subordinated debt is held at arms length) and limiting 
the yield of qualifying subordinated debt are two additional steps the government should 
consider. 
 
Does the Argentine regulatory system provide a model that other countries should 
adopt?  We think the capital requirements, liquidity requirements, and B.A.S.I.C. system 
offer an excellent set of blueprints for any country to consider if is serious about fostering 
market discipline in banking.  At the same time, experience in developing and developed 
economies alike has shown that a regulatory system is only as effective as the political 
will that underlies its enforcement.  In many countries – notably  Chile in 1982, the 
United States in 1984, and Venezuela in 1991 – de facto deposit insurance was provided 
despite its de jure absence.   
During the tequila crisis of 1995 in Argentina (as during the liberalization of 
Estonia’s banks in 1991) the government chose to force insolvent banks to close and 
permitted depositors in insolvent banks to lose a significant proportion of their deposits.   42 
The political commitment to low inflation and to reform of the banking system in 
Argentina in the wake of the inflation and banking disasters of the earlier era set 
constraints on government policy toward banks in the 1990s, limiting the possibility of 
large bailout expenditures or other interventions into the banking system.  The ability to 
apply the Argentine approach successfully to other countries likely depends on the 
existence of a similar political will backing real reform and limiting bailouts.  Thus the 
challenges for reformers in emerging market countries include not only the technical 
problem of how to design an effective regulatory system, but the more difficult problem 
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Table A1   The Timing of Privatizations 
















Corrientes *  11/91  -  NA  -  5/93  60%  NA 
La Rioja *  NA  -  NA  -  7/94  70%  NA 
Chaco **  5/93  8/95  7/94  11/95  11/94  60%  78 
Entre Ríos **  8/93  8/95  8/94  10/95  1/95  60%  78 
Formosa 2/95  4/95  3/95  7/95 12/95  60%  80 
Misiones   11/94  4/95  11/94  7/95  1/96  92.5% ***  78 
Río Negro  3/95  4/95  8/95  7/95  3/96  85%  80 
Salta 7/94  4/95  8/95  7/95  3/96  70%  50 
Tucumán 3/95  6/95  7/95 7/95  7/96 75%  80 
San Luis  12/89  4/95  4/96  10/95  8/96  100%  50 
Santiago del 
Estero  1/95 4/95 3/96  7/95  9/96  95% 50 




3/95 4/95  11/95  5/95  11/96  90%  100 
Mendoza  3/95 4/95  11/95  5/95  11/96  90%  160 
Jujuy  6/95 6/95 8/97  12/95  1/98  80% 50 
Santa Fe  7/96 12/96 9/97  5/97  6/98  100%  160 
Santa Cruz  10/95 3/98 3/98  4/98  10/98  56% 80 
Municipal de 
Tucumán  12/93 12/96 2/97  6/97  7/98  100% 25 
Catamarca  NA 9/98  -  4/98  -  70%  50 
Caja Nacional 
de Ahorro y 
Seguro * 
NA - NA  -  5/96  100%  NA 
 
Source: Subsecretaría de Programación Regional – Trust Fund  for Provincial Development 
Note: The  Banco Municipal de Paraná was assisted by the TFPD by an amount of  20 million dollars for  closure. 
* Privatizations not supported by the TFPD. 
** The Banco del Chaco and the Banco de Entre Ríos were privatized previous TFPD creation. 
*** Corresponds  to the privatization of 100% of the bank’s capital, since the rest was in private hands. 
 
 
 